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INTRODUCTION: YES, VIRGINIA, THERE IS TRANSGENDER LAW
1

“When is a murder not a murder? When the victim is transsexual.”

Sadly, transsexuals2 long have had to face this sort of attitude from
3
the legal system. This unwillingness to provide transsexuals with
4
basic legal protection comes not just from criminal law.
Transsexuals’ very identities are currently under attack in a number
of courts5 even though almost half of the jurisdictions in the United
1. Kevin Rothstein, Travesty of Justice, BOSTON PHOENIX (May 1997), available at http://12.
11.184.13/archive/1in10/97/05/eMURDER.html (noting how the killer of pre-operative
transsexual Chanele Pickett used a variation of the “homosexual panic defense” to end up with
a conviction for assault rather than murder).
2. Numerous articles addressing legal aspects of transsexualism include a litany of
definitions pertinent to the subject. Although the genuine ignorance about transgender issues
which abounds in the legal profession all but demands that such a list be a part of articles on
the subject, the limited focus of this Article makes me inclined to include only two critical ones:
‘transsexual’ and ‘transgender.’
A transsexual is an individual whose internal sense of being male or female is at variance with
his or her physical appearance and desires to correct the variance via hormone treatment
and/or surgery. ‘Transgender,’ as it is widely used today, is an umbrella term which includes
not only transsexuals but also other categories of gender-variant people, though it had
originally been used to refer to transsexuals who, though hormonally altered and living as
members of the opposite gender, ultimately opted not to have sex reassignment surgery. See
PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY 3-4 (2000).
3. Though certainly not all perceived mistreatment of transsexuals is animus-laden, the
words of Debra Sherman Tedeschi ring true: “Whenever a transsexual goes to court, the legal
system is automatically faced with a situation with which it is ill-equipped to deal: ambiguity and
indefiniteness.” Debra Sherman Tedeschi, The Predicament of the Transsexual Prisoner, 5 TEMPLE
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 27, 46 (1995).
4. Actually, some of transsexuals’ most notable successes have come in the criminal law
arena: challenging laws which criminalize crossdressing. Such challenges historically have
resulted in the laws being declared unconstitutional, at least as applied to transsexuals. See
Laura Richards Craft & Matthew A. Hodel, City of Chicago v. Wilson and Constitutional Protection
for Personal Appearance: Cross-Dressing as an Element of Sexual Identity, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1151, 116467 (1979) (discussing various laws dealing with personal appearance), construed in Symposium,
Family and the Political Landscape for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender People (LGBT) Opening
Remarks: Queer Recount, 64 ALB. L. REV. 889 (2001); Katrina C. Rose, The Transsexual and the
Damage Done: The Fourth Court of Appeals Opens PanDOMA’s Box By Closing the Door on Transsexuals’
Right to Marry, 9 J.L. & SEX. 1, 6 (1999-2000) [hereinafter Rose, Transsexual and the Damage Done]
(discussing Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999)).
5. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 223-24 (Tex. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872
(2000) (discussing the question of when a man is a man and a woman is a woman); see also
Goins v. West Group, 619 N.W.2d 424, 427 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (deciding a claim of sexual
discrimination where an employee was denied use of women’s restrooms in the workplace
based on the fact that her female self-image was not traditionally associated with her biological
maleness); In re Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086, 1109 (Kan. App. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 23 P.2d
902 (Kan. App. 2001) (finding a material fact exists as to whether the transsexual, at the time of
the marriage license, was in fact a woman).
Strictly in terms of criminal law, this is of greater importance in jurisdictions where a person’s
status as male or female can be an element of a crime. Compare Regina v. Tan (Moria), [1983]
Q.B. 1053 (C.A.) (holding that a male-to-female transsexual was male for purposes of a statute
which made it illegal for a male to live off of wages earned from prostitution), with R. v. Cogley,
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States have specific statutes which allow transsexuals to change their
6
sex designation on their birth certificates, and every state but one
has statutory language that is sufficient to permit a transsexual to do
so, if the language is interpreted fairly.7
In addition to the specific exclusion of most transgendered people
8
from the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), a line of federal

[1989] VR 799 (Sup. Ct. Victoria) (holding that a male-to-female transsexual was female for
purposes of status as a rape victim).
6. See Stephanie Belser, Don’t Make a Federal Case of it: Gender Outlaws and Employment
Discrimination, 2 S. TEX. C.L. J. 17, 33 (1998) (noting that these statutes exist in twenty-one
states, the District of Columbia, and Guam). California’s Legislature recently approved a bill to
provide a mechanism for California’s transsexual residents who were not born in California to
get gender change documentation. See 1999 Cal. A.B. 1851. However, Governor Gray Davis
vetoed the bill. The veto message is regarded by transgender rights supporters as being either
callously disingenuous or completely ignorant of what the bill was designed to do. See
PlanetOut News Staff, CA Trans* Certificate Bill Vetoed (Sept. 21, 2000), available at
http://www.planetout.com/news/article-print.html?2000/09/21/3; see also Boyce Hinman, CA:
Response to Veto of A.B. 1851, Lambda Letters Project Press Release, available at
http://gender.org/gain/g00/g092000.htm (“The objections to the bill, voiced by the Governor
in his veto message simply are not valid.”).
The fate of A.B. 1851 was not the only strange end for transgender-related legislation
in California in 2000. According to San Francisco’s Bay Area Reporter, an effort which had
already been approved by the state Assembly to add transgendered people to that state’s
employment anti-discrimination law, appears to have died in a Senate committee specifically
because of a negative recommendation by a lesbian member of Governor Davis’ cabinet. Katie
Szymanski, Lesbian Kills TG Bill; Handful of Gay Bills Pass Legislature, BAY AREA REP., Sept. 7, 2000,
at 6.
7. Compare Ex parte Torres, No. CC-97-639, 2000 PR Sup. LEXIS 104, at *75 (approving of
a post-operative transsexual’s petition to change the sex designation on her birth certificate
from male to female), Darnell v. Lloyd, 395 F. Supp. 1210, 1214 (D. Conn. 1975), and 1975
MASS. A.G. OP. 62, 64 (construing general statutory language to permit birth certificate changes
for transsexuals), with In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 831 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987) (ignoring protransgender cases and misapplying K. v. Health Div. of Human Res., 560 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Or.
1977), to deny a transsexual’s request to change the sex designation on her birth certificate).
Only one state, Tennessee, has ever passed a statute that specifically prohibits such
birth certificate changes. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-203(d) (1999).
8. The law codifies the notion that these conditions are, in the words of Senator Jesse
Helms, “‘moral problems, not mental handicaps’ that they are ‘addictions’ with ‘moral content’
whose presence might render an individual unfit for working life.” Adrienne L. Hiegel, Sexual
Exclusions: The Americans with Disabilities Act as a Moral Code, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1451, 1476-77
(1994) (quoting Sen. Helms from the Congressional Record, March 17, 1988) (citations
omitted). Language strikingly similar to the federal exclusion now can be found in several state
versions of the ADA. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-5-6(d)(3) (Michie 2000); IOWA CODE §
15.102, Subd. 5.b(1)(b) & § 225C.46 Subd. 1.a.(2)(b) (1999); 51 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
2232(11)(b) (2000); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-1102(9) (2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4112.01(16)(b)(ii) (2000).
A definitional reference to the federal statute was recently removed from California’s
ADA. See 2000 Cal. Stat. 1049. This has prompted some transgender advocates to say that
transgendered people are now covered under the law rather than excluded from its protection.
See Press Release, Transpeople Removed From California Disability Exclusions (Oct. 11, 2000)
(on file with author). While the changes made by the 2000 enactment are not as clear-cut as
those advocates assert, and the ultimate effect yet to be proven, it bears noting that even prior
to Ch. 1049, a provision of the California Government Code prohibited both “sexual
harassment” and “gender harassment” under the definition of “‘harassment’ because of sex.”
CAL. GOV’T CODE. ANN. § 12940(h)(3)(C) (West 1999).
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9
decisions have held that Title VII’s prohibition of employment
10
does not encompass
discrimination “because of . . . sex”
discrimination because of change of sex.11 Schwenk v. Hartford,12
however, may be the positive turning point that transsexuals have
long sought in gaining federal protection from employment
discrimination solely because they are transsexual.
Somewhat
strangely, Schwenk was not an employment law case at all, but rather a
civil rights action brought by a pre-operative transsexual prisoner
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a provision of the now-eviscerated
Violence Against Women Act.13
Employment issues are important to all but the most financially
14
secure of transsexuals and, although such issues have long been the
15
subject of legal commentary and likely will be for the foreseeable
future, they are not the focus of this article. However, this piece
addresses the Title VII implications of Schwenk as well as other
transgender legal concerns,16 simply to point out to legal

9. See Dillon v. Frank, 952 F.2d 403, 405 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting that the plain meaning of
Title VII does not provide a remedy for a hostile environment created by taunts aimed at
plaintiff’s homosexuality); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir.
1989) (stating that the words utilized in Title VII do not prohibit discrimination based upon
homosexuality); see also Ulane v. E. Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that
Title VII does not protect transsexuals since all words in the statute are given ordinary, common
meaning).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
11. See infra Part III.A.
12. 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000); see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 681 (2000)
(holding Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment legislative
powers in establishing the Violence Against Women Act’s federal cause of action); see also Julie
Goldscheid, The Second Circuit Addresses Genderbased Violence: A Review of Violence Against Women
Act Cases, 66 BROOKLYN L. REV. 457, 457-58 (2000).
14. Professor Dierdre McCloskey acknowledged that her upper middleclass status made
her gender transition smoother than it may otherwise have been. See generally DIERDRE
MCCLOSKEY, CROSSING — A MEMOIR 53 (2000) (discussing the ways in which her financial
standing and social status made the transition easier).
15. For one of the better earlier articles, see Stuart A. Wein & Cynthia Lark Remmers,
Employment Protection and Gender Dysphoria: Legal Definitions of Unequal Treatment on the Basis of Sex
and Disability, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1075, 1098 (1979) (proposing that discrimination against
transsexuals may be cognizable under Title VII).
16. I will not address hate crimes legislation to any significant extent other than that to
which the Violence Against Women Act can be considered a hate crime law. The subject of
hate crime legislation in general is worthy of considerable debate in its own right. See Craig L.
Uhrich, Hate Crime Legislation: A Public Policy Analysis, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1467, 1470-71 (1999)
(discussing the criminal theory and public policy arguments affecting both state and federal
anti-hate crime legislation). However, it should be noted that a major dispute has arisen
between the transgendered community in New York and a gay male state representative as to
whether that state’s recently-enacted hate crimes law covers transgendered people. See Tom
McGeveran, Transgendered Activists Speak Out, N.Y. BLADE, Sept. 1, 2000, at 11. The law does not
specifically mention transgendered people, nor does it contain a definition of sexual
orientation that is similar to the trans-inclusive one in Minnesota’s Human Rights Act. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 363.01, Subd. 45 (West Supp. 2000). However, the law does address an attacker’s
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professionals the difficulties with any case involving transsexualism,
where simple answers and seemingly black-and-white distinctions
almost never work, on any level.
For example, though the federal government and a majority of
17
states have passed so-called ‘Defense of Marriage’ acts, purporting to
establish a government right to deny recognition to same-sex
marriages, none of these statutes address how a same-sex marriage
ban affects marriages involving transsexuals. Likewise, statutes which
specifically allow transsexuals to change the sex designation on their
birth certificates do not specifically address the issue either, even
though dicta from one of the most virulently anti-transsexual judicial
decisions, Ohio’s trial-level In re Ladrach,18 surmised that any state
which allows transsexual birth certificate changes must allow
19
transsexuals to marry as well.
Transsexual gender status is a broad issue that can touch all areas
of the law. However, this article leads to a narrow issue — an
extremely disturbing aspect of the Schwenk litigation which could
easily be missed when simply looking at the holding. Specifically,
concern lies with precisely what Washington State Attorneys were
willing, in their effort to help the state avoid liability for actions
alleged to have been perpetrated by state prison guards, to argue —
that the guards’ actions did not constitute attempted rape. Because of
“belief or perception regarding the . . . gender . . . of a person, regardless of whether the belief
or perception is correct.” 2000 N.Y. Laws 107 § 2. While some believe that this language is
inclusive of transgendered people, others do not, which caused several representatives of the
transgendered community to walk out of a post-enactment meeting with the aforementioned
State Rep., Tom Duane. See McGeveran, supra, at 11.
17. See generally ANDREW SULLIVAN, SAME SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON 223 (1996)
(discussing the federal and various state Defense of Marriage Acts).
18. 513 N.E.2d 828, 831 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987) (holding that a postoperative male to
female transsexual could not obtain a marriage license to marry a male).
19. This perhaps is why an attorney challenging the gender status of a Kansas transsexual
widow stated matter-of-factly, “To the best of my knowledge, no state’s legislation says that for
purposes of marriage a person can change sex and become a woman or vice versa.” John T.
Dauner, Wealth and a Sex Change Are Highlights of Kansas Estate Litigation, KAN. CITY STAR, June
24, 2000, at A1; see also Katrina C. Rose, Littleton v. Prange: The Next Generation?, TEX. TRIANGLE,
July 7, 2000, at 8 [hereinafter Rose, Littleton v. Prange]. That position, of course, also ignores
the holding in M.T. v. J.T, 355 A.2d 204, 211 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1976), cert. denied, 364 A.2d
1076 (N.J. 1976), the seminal case on transsexual marriages in America, which held that a
transsexual who underwent successful sex reassignment surgery to become both physically and
physiologically a woman was legally married to her husband. Fortunately, the appellate court
which reviewed the case did not ignore the New Jersey decision even though it did ignore the
Ladrach logic declaration, that a state which allows birth certificate changes for a transsexual
would have to allow that transsexual to marry in her post-transition gender. See In re Gardiner,
22 P.3d 1086, 1104-05 (Kan. App. 2001). The British Columbia Supreme Court, however,
recently ruled that compliance with that province’s birth certificate statute necessitated
according a post-operative transsexual the full status of the post-transition gender. See
Vancouver Rape Relief Soc’y v. British Columbia Human Rights Comm’n, 2000 BCTC 1809
(B.C. Sup. Ct. 2000).
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20
one possible implication of the theory put forth by the defense in
Schwenk, I hope that readers will recognize that the legal system’s
historic willingness to avoid the plain fact that transsexualism is “an
evident reality that demands a legal solution,”21 not to mention the
general judicial deference to penological discretion that allows
“place[ment of] transgendered prisoners either in a virtual torture
chamber of incessant sexual humiliation or in a more benign
22
environment,” has never had any real winners. But, had the defense
prevailed in Schwenk, the legal system could have made losers out of
society at large.

II. SCHWENK V. HARTFORD: THE FACT PATTERN
A. A Prefatory Note on Transgender Prison Litigation
Precisely how many transsexuals are incarcerated is unknown — as
23
Two decades ago, a San
is the number of transsexuals overall.
Francisco official estimated that “at least ten percent of the city’s
24
prisoners are either homosexual or transsexual.” During that same
era, a doctor at Rikers Island jail in New York City estimated that of
every sixty inmate patients he had seen, “three or four” were
transsexual.25
As indicated above, a person’s legal sex classification for purposes
of marriage is important — although it is an issue with which most
26
Likewise,
non-transgendered people never have to deal.
20. Though I do freely admit not likely. See infra, Part V.B.
21. Ex parte Torres, 2000 PR Sup. LEXIS 104, at *19 (approving of a post-operative
transsexual’s petition to change the sex designation on her birth certificate from male to
female); quoted passage translated in, Ivan Roman, Court Gives Gay-Rights Activists Hope, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, July 17, 2000, at A6.
22. Darren Rosenblum, “Trapped” in Sing Sing: Transgendered Prisoners Caught in the Gender
Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499, 517 (2000).
23. Taking into account all known medical conditions which result in variance from the
concrete, yet incorrect, assumption that ‘XX chromosomes = female’ and ‘XY chromosomes =
male,’ the percentage of humans who are transgendered in some form is estimated to be
between one tenth of one percent and four percent. See Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and
Female: Intersexuality and Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 267-68 (1999);
Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female are not Enough, SCI., Mar.-Apr. 1993, at
20-21; ALICE D. DREGER, HERMAPHRODITES AND THE MEDICAL INVENTION OF SEX 43 (1998).
Perhaps most significantly, in terms of opposition to the “chromosomes = sex” standard, one in
every 45,000 males has the so-called “normal” female XX pattern. See Wayne Scott Cole,
Transsexuals in Search of Legal Acceptance: The Constitutionality of the Chromosome Test, 15 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 331, 335 n.17 (1978).
24. Ralph Gardner, Jr., For Transsexuals, Prison is ‘Ten Times as Rough,’ CORRECTIONS MAG.,
Feb. 1981, at 32.
25. Id.
26. Nevertheless, the logical implication of Littleton is that they might. See Rose, Littleton v.
Prange, supra note 19, at 8.
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27
incarceration is something that most people never encounter. In
addition, the vast majority of people who do end up behind bars do
not present jailers with the problem of deciding to house them in the
male, or the female part of the jail facility. Since almost all jails and
28
prisons are sex-segregated, the question of where to house male-tofemale transsexuals has resulted in disputes that often lead to
litigation.29
If Crystal Schwenk has ever challenged her assignment to a male
prison facility, it appears not to have been an issue in the litigation
that led to the Ninth Circuit’s decision on February 29, 2000. I point
this out because most litigation involving transsexual inmates seems
30
to involve those who have not undergone sex reassignment surgery.
The Second Circuit, in a case involving a post-operative transsexual
inmate whose transition was revealed to other inmates by prison
officials, stated that it would be difficult to conceive of instances “in
which the disclosure of an inmate’s transsexualism — a condition
which (obviously) is not contagious — serves legitimate penological
interests, especially given that, in the sexually charged atmosphere of
most prison settings, such disclosure might lead to inmate-on-inmate
violence.”31 For those who are overly anxious to see a ‘slippery slope,’
rest assured that neither my support for more humane treatment of
both pre- and post-operative transsexual inmates nor my approval of
the holding in the aforementioned case, Powell v. Schriver,32 should be
read as a suggestion that Eighth Amendment jurisprudence needs to

27. See, e.g., Rosenblum, supra note 22.
28. The simple matter of pronouns can be used as a means of humiliating the incarcerated
transsexual. Referring to a transsexual as “it” is not unknown. See Cole, supra note 23, at 342
n.54; see also James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 1279,
1306 n.71 (2000).
29. See, e.g., infra notes 31-32.
30. Occasionally, the issue of gender status for a transsexual with respect to the prison
system involves not the prisoner but the prisoner’s spouse — an issue for prisons that allow
conjugal visits from opposite-sex spouses but not same-sex partners. See ASSOC. PRESS, Mar. 16,
1978 (“‘Her operation was a success and we’ll accept it,’ Dr. William Welch of the California
Medical Facility staff said.”).
Interestingly, the couple was married at the prison. Id. And, a lengthy feature on the
wedding appeared in at least one major California newspaper at the time, only a short time
prior to the California Senate’s final consideration — and ultimate passage — of a bill to allow
transsexuals’ birth certificates to be changed to reflect gender reassignment. WEST’S ANN. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103425 (West 2001); Walter Blum, Kate’s Wedding Day . . . . And Night,
S.F. EXAMINER & CHRON., Aug. 7, 1977, at 12. The significant aspect of this story is that it runs
against any notion that there was no intent on the part of the Legislature not to allow
transsexuals to marry post-transition.
31. Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 1999).
32. See id. at 115 (holding that a prison guard and supervisor were deliberately indifferent
to the safety of a transsexual inmate, in violation of her Eighth Amendment right, by disclosing
her transsexual status).
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be expanded to allow a transsexual inmate, even a post-operative one,
to sue solely for being referred to with a no-longer-appropriate
33
pronoun, as once happened in Germany.
Powell involved the ‘outing’ of an inmate and the potential
jeopardizing of her safety. Schwenk also involved the potential
jeopardizing of a transsexual inmate’s safety — though under
decidedly different circumstances.
B. Crystal Schwenk’s Allegations Against Robert Mitchell
1.

Caveat

Due to the serious nature of Schwenk’s allegations, it is important
to keep in mind that Schwenk v. Hartford was an interlocutory appeal
from a denial of a summary judgment motion. A “reviewing court
must assume the nonmoving party’s version of the facts to be
34
correct.” This article addresses the light in which the State asked the
court to view the allegations against prison guard Robert Mitchell,
assuming that those allegations were true. I take absolutely no
position regarding whether they are, in fact, true. For the record, I
adopted a similar posture in my criticism of Littleton v. Prange,35 a
wrongful death medical malpractice action in which a transsexual
36
widow was, inaccurately in my view, declared to be male.
2.

The Allegations Themselves

Crystal Marie Schwenk is a pre-operative male-to-female transsexual
37
who plans someday to obtain sex reassignment surgery (SRS). Judge
Reinhardt’s opinion states that Schwenk “asserts” this pre-operative
transsexual status. This might initially seem to be disrespectful;
however, it is not, as Schwenk’s background indicates that she had
never been formally diagnosed with gender dysphoria38 prior to her
incarceration. As part of her case, she submitted the declaration of a

33. See Whitman, supra note 28, at 1306 n.71 (arguing that German civility laws and hatespeech regulations give rise to a more respectful society than the United States).
34. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1187 n.3 (citing Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 977
(9th Cir. 1997)).
35. 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a transsexual spouse did not have
standing to bring a medical malpractice action under the wrongful death survival statute, in her
capacity as the surviving spouse of a male patient), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872 (2000).
36. See Rose, Transsexual and the Damage Done, supra note 4, at 55 n.300.
37. See Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1193.
38. See generally AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL
MENTAL DISORDERS 532-38 (4th ed. 1994) (providing the lengthy diagnostic criteria for
gender identity disorder).
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University of Washington adjunct Professor of Psychiatry and
Behavioral Sciences that, based on an interview with Schwenk and a
39
review of her records, Schwenk is indeed transsexual. Moreover,
Judge Reinhardt refers to her as “she” and by her adopted name of
“Crystal Marie Schwenk” rather than “he” and “Douglas W. Schwenk,”
the name listed in court documents.40
In June of 1993, Schwenk was incarcerated in the all-male
Washington State Penitentiary in Walla Walla. In September of the
following year, she was transferred to the prison’s medium security
Baker Unit, where Robert Mitchell, one of three named defendants,
was employed as a guard. According to Mitchell, shortly after
Schwenk arrived at Baker, other inmates told him Schwenk was
homosexual. He admitted that, soon afterward, Schwenk told him
that she intended to have a “sex change operation” after her release,
repeating this assertion to him “from time to time.”41 According to
Schwenk, Mitchell referred to her as Crystal rather than her legal
42
name, Douglas.
The basis of Schwenk’s suit are allegations that shortly after she
arrived at Baker, Mitchell subjected her to a series of unwelcome
sexual advances and harassment and, ultimately, a sexual assault.
Th[e] harassment began with “winking, performing explicit actions
imitating oral sex, making obscene and threatening comments,
watching Plaintiff in the shower while ‘grinding’ his hand on his
crotch area, and repeatedly demanding that Plaintiff engage in
sexual acts with him.” Then, in late 1994, Mitchell asked Schwenk
to have sex with him in the staff bathroom, offering to bring her
make-up and “girl stuff” in exchange for sex . . . . [Upon being
43
rebuffed by Schwenk,] Mitchell grabbed . . . and groped her.

She pushed him away and ran back to her cell crying, but later that
same day, Mitchell again approached Schwenk and told her that he
44
had had oral sex with a former inmate. Also, Mitchell stated that he
planned to have sex with his neighbor’s young son, whom he claimed
to be “‘grooming’ for the experience.”45 Schwenk testified, “Once
39. See Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1193 n.4.
40. Id. at 1193.
41. Crystal Marie Schwenk testified that she had made other prison officials aware of her
being transsexual. Id.
42. See id. at 1192-93 (according to Schwenk, she considers herself female and has been
known as “Crystal Marie” since early adolescence).
43. Id. at 1193 (documenting sexual misconduct that Mitchell directed towards Schwenk).
44. See Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1193 (detailing the sexually explicit conversations between
Mitchell and Schwenk).
45. Id.
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46

Mitchell told me that I — I freaked.”
Shortly thereafter, she asserts that Mitchell entered her cell and,
upon noticing that they were alone, demanded that she perform oral
sex on him. She refused and told him to get out. However, he then
unzipped his pants, pulled out his penis, and reiterated the demand
for oral sex.47 This encounter, by far the most serious of Schwenk’s
allegations, eventually included closing the cell door, grabbing her,
turning her around forcibly, pushing her against the bars, and
grinding his exposed penis into her buttocks. Schwenk’s testimony
indicated that she told him to “leave me alone” but that “he didn’t
listen to me.”48 However, the attack did stop, apparently when
Mitchell sensed that he might be detected.49 Later that week,
Mitchell again demanded sexual favors, and Schwenk again refused.
This time, however, Mitchell threatened retaliation in the form of
arranging to get her “infracted” and sent to a more dangerous area of
50
the prison, which, in fact, did happen early in 1995.
Schwenk subsequently filed an administrative grievance,51 and later,
a pro se complaint in federal court against Mitchell and various
institutional defendants in which she alleged that the sexual assault
52
violated her Eighth Amendment rights. Counsel was appointed for
her, and an amended complaint adding a claim under the Gender53
Motivated Violence Act (“GMVA”), a portion of the Violence

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 1194 (asserting from Schwenk’s testimony that Mitchell was dangerous).
Id.
Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1194.
Id.
Id.

51. See id. (following this filing, the prison denied the grievance on the grounds that it was
untimely). The complaint was filed ten days after the incident and regulations require that any
complaints be filed within five days of any alleged incidents. Id.
52. Although worthy of full analysis in its own right, particularly in light of the fact that one
of the leading Eighth Amendment cases, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), is, to date, the
only opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court to address transsexual existence to any significant
degree, this Article will not focus on the ultimate viability of Schwenk’s claims. Rather, the
critical point of this article is the attitude of the defense — a defense put on by the State —
which yielded a disturbing claim regarding what constitutes attempted rape.
For articles which look at Farmer in more depth, see Stacy Lancaster Cozad, Cruel But Not
So Unusual: Farmer v. Brennan and the Devolving Standards of Decency, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 175, 176
(1995); John Boston et al., Farmer v. Brennan: Defining Deliberate Indifference Under the Eighth
Amendment, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 83, 84 (1994); Lisa DiBartolomeo, Subjective Awareness
Governs the Deliberate Indifference Standard in Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claim, 29 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 294, 295 (1995); Jason D. Sanabria, Farmer v. Brennan: Do Prisoners Have Any Rights Left
Under the Eighth Amendment?, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1995).
53. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement (Gender-Motivated Violence) Act of
1994 § 40302(c), 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994 & Supp.) (rev’d) (permitting a perpetrator who has
committed a violent crime because of the victim’s gender to be sued in federal or state court).
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54
Against Women Act, was filed. After dismissing the institutional
defendants, the district court “converted Mitchell’s motion to dismiss
into a motion for summary judgment and allowed discovery to
proceed.”55 Ultimately, the district court denied Mitchell’s motion,
56
which had been based on qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit
upheld the denial as to Schwenk’s civil rights action but reversed on
the GMVA claim.57

III. HOW TITLE VII CREPT INTO A CASE INVOLVING THIS SET OF FACTS
In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
58
Morrison, overturning the portion of the Violence Against Women
Act59 under which Schwenk had brought suit, a victory on this portion
60
of her action would have been short-lived. Timing is everything,
however, and, in this instance, the then-extant viability of the GMVA,
when the Ninth Circuit issued its decision, may benefit transsexuals
more than Ms. Schwenk could have imagined when she filed suit.
A. Transsexuals and Title VII, Pre-Schwenk
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that “to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
61
individual’s . . . sex” is unlawful. Though a number of decisions
held against transsexuals throughout the 1970s and 1980s,62 the
63
Seventh Circuit’s 1984 decision in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines is
54. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement (Violence Against Women) Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
55. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1194.
56. See Jeffers v. Gomez, 240 F.3d 845, 853 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)) (noting that law enforcement officers, including prison guards, enjoy
qualified immunity from civil damages unless the conduct violated “clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known”).
57. See Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1192-93, 1205 (finding that although the GMVA covers the
defendant’s alleged conduct, “the law regarding the scope and applicability of that statute was
not clearly established at the time of the assault . . . .”).
58. 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
59. 44 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
60. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Schwenk was issued on February 29, 2000; less than
three months later, on May 15, 2000, the Supreme Court decided Morrison.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
62. See Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding that
a transsexual’s decision to have a sex change does not bring that person, or a class of
transsexuals, under the purview of Title VII); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750
(8th Cir. 1982) (holding that “sex” under Title VII does not include transsexualism).
63. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985).
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generally regarded as being to transgender employment law in
64
America what Corbett v. Corbett is to legal recognition of gender
transition in England.
65
The case primarily involved two Title VII discrimination claims by
Karen Ulane, who had been a pilot with Eastern Airlines from 1968 to
66
1981 — initially as Kenneth but later as Karen. She claimed her
firing amounted to discrimination because she was transsexual and
67
because she was female. The district court found that Eastern had
indeed discharged Ulane because she was transsexual.68 Significantly,
69
it also found that Title VII prohibited such discrimination. The
Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court interpretation of
Title VII to be, as Judge Wood summarized the lower court
interpretation for a unanimous panel, “a remedial statute to be
liberally construed . . . to hold that the statutory word ‘sex’ literally
and scientifically applies to transsexuals . . . .”70
After citing the somewhat familiar history of how the word sex

64. [1970] P. 83; 2 All ER 33. Judge Ormrod’s heavily-criticized opinion created the
‘chromosomes = sex’ standard which precludes transsexuals from achieving full legal
recognition of gender transition. To say that this is a minority view among jurisdictions which
have fully, or at least adequately, addressed the issue is an understatement. See Belser, supra
note 6, at 33; see generally Ex parte Torres, No. CC-97-639, 2000 PR Sup. LEXIS 104 (P.R. June 30,
2000). Still, whenever the question of transgender legal status arises in a jurisdiction that has
no statute specific enough for a reviewing court’s liking, the judicial addiction to Corbett
surfaces. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 226 (Tex. App. 1999). Although the European Courts have
intervened to the benefit of transsexuals in other countries in Europe, they have never seen fit
to overrule Corbett’s applicability to England. Compare Rees v. United Kingdom, 81 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser.A) at 56 (1986), with B. v. France [1992] 2 FLR 249. However, even the intransigence of
England is on the verge of giving way. Parliament has recently begun serious study of the
problems created by the Corbett standard and legislation is expected soon which will overrule
Corbett. See Christine Burns, 101 Unequal Ways to Treat You Equally (Mar. 2, 2001), available at
http://www.pfc.org.uk/news/2000/101ways.htm (last modified Nov. 18, 2000) (providing an
update on the legislative attempts to provide protection from discrimination to “trans people”).
Whether such legislation will occur during the lifetime of April Ashley, the transsexual party in
Corbett, is another matter. See also Jane Warren, The Express, Forty Years After My Sex Change I’m
Still Treated as a Joke, Though I Don’t Get My Face Slapped Any More (July 28, 2000), available at
http://www.pfc.org.uk/news/2000/acrex.htm.
65. There were other claims as well, but those are not what the case is known for. See
Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1082 n.1.
66. In Judge Wood’s words, “Eastern was not aware of Ulane’s transsexuality, the hormone
treatments, or her psychiatric counseling until she attempted to return to work after her sex
reassignment surgery. Eastern knew Ulane only as one of its male pilots.” Id. at 1083.
67. Id. at 1082.
68. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, 581 F. Supp. 821, 828 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding that Ulane’s
discharge was particularly suspect because the issue of her dismissal did not arise until after her
surgery).
69. See id. at 837 (finding that Title VII was violated because Ulane was treated disparately
as a result of her transsexual status and that Eastern Airlines’ treatment of her was not
substantially related to the operation of its business).
70. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084.
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71
became part of Title VII, Judge Wood abruptly declared that

[t]he total lack of legislative history supporting the sex amendment
[to the bill that ultimately was enacted as the Civil Rights Act of
1964] coupled with the circumstances of the amendment’s
adoption clearly indicates that Congress never considered nor
intended that this 1964 legislation apply to anything other than the
72
traditional concept of sex.

Clearly, reduced to a mathematical equation, Wood’s logic is 0 = -1.
The dearth of legislative history could have just as easily led to a 0 = 1,
and protection for those who have transitioned or intend to do so.
Adding to this logic gap in the ultimate holding, Wood also
brought up attempts by Congress to expand Title VII to cover
homosexuals and bisexuals.73
However, even after properly
acknowledging that those bills did not address transsexuals, he went
on to imply that the failure of such attempts — occurring subsequent
to the first of the anti-transsexual Title VII decisions — were
nevertheless indicative of a Congressional intent not to cover
transsexuals.74 The definitions of who and what were covered by those
bills varied from:
having or manifesting an emotional or physical attachment to
another consenting person or persons of either gender, or having
75
or manifesting a preference for such attachment

which was contained in a bill introduced by Rep. Bella Abzug, to:
male or female homosexuality, heterosexuality, and bisexuality by
76
orientation or practice, by and between consenting adults.

Beyond the muddying of the waters, though, the depth of the antitranssexual attitude of the Ulane court can be discerned simply from
Judge Wood’s description of male-to-female transsexual Karen Ulane
77
as something that has been “created from what remains of a man.”
71. See id. at 1085 (tracing the legislative history of Title VII that “sex” as a class was added
to kill the Civil Rights Act); see also Robert Stevens Miller, Jr., Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 879-84 (1967).
72. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 (emphasis added).
73. See id. at 1085 n.11 (citing the failed attempts to include sexual orientation within the
purview of Title VII).
74. See id. at 1086.
75. Civil Rights Amendments of 1975, H.R. 166, 94th Cong. § 11 (1975) (defining
“affectional or sexual preference”).
76. Civil Rights Amendments of 1975, H.R. 3371, 97th Cong. § 8 (1981) (defining
“affectional or sexual orientation”). A Senate bill introduced in the same session by Sen. Paul
Tsongas used the same language as a definition of “sexual orientation.” S. 1708, 97th Cong.
(1981).
77. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087 (stating that the district court’s finding that Ulane also had
been discriminated against as a woman was not sufficiently supported by factual findings); see
also id. (arguing that Judge Wood concluded his opinion with positive language for transsexuals
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Wood could not have tipped his hand any further had he quoted
directly from Janice Raymond’s tract, The Transsexual Empire, and
78
simply referred to Ulane as a “male into constructed female.”
Imagine the outcry, though, had Wood referred to a convert to
Judaism as something created from “what remains” of a Christian (or
79
vice versa). The position that “because of such individual’s . . . sex”
does not cover discrimination because of change of sex is all but
devoid of logic in light of Title VII also prohibiting discrimination
because of religion. It is simply inconceivable that a court would not
find that a person who had been discriminated against solely because
the person had changed from one religion to another could state a
claim under Title VII for religion-based discrimination. Yet, if the
same person changed his or her sex and was discriminated against
specifically on that basis, the same court likely, at least prior to Schwenk,
would hold that the person was unprotected by Title VII. 80
B. GMVA
Judge Reinhardt’s ruling against Schwenk on her GMVA claim was
not based on any ultimate inapplicability of the Act to transsexuals.
In fact, he said it is applicable to transsexuals, but that her claim
should fail because, “the law regarding the scope and applicability of
that statute was not clearly established at the time of the assault on
Schwenk, at least with respect to questions of gender motivation and
81
animus.” Most significantly, however, in reaching his conclusion
that transsexuals were afforded protection under the GMVA, Judge
Reinhardt analogized transsexuals’ protection under the GMVA to
their protection under Title VII.
Mitchell made an argument similar to those used successfully
seeking redress under Title VII by holding that “[i]f Eastern had considered Ulane to be female
and had discriminated against her because she was female (i.e., Eastern treated females less
favorably than males), then the argument might be made that Title VII applied”) (citing
Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977)).
78. See JANICE RAYMOND, THE TRANSSEXUAL EMPIRE (13th ed. 1994); see also Janice
Raymond, Paper Prepared for the National Center for Health Care Technology on the Social and Ethical
Aspects of Transsexual Surgery (1980), available at http://home.att.net/~jackie40/text/ts1.txt (last
visited July 14, 2001) (elaborating on The Transsexual Empire, first published in 1979). But see
Sandy Stone, The Empire Strikes Back (1994), available at http://eserver.org/gender/the-empirestrikes-back.txt (last visited Nov. 19, 2000) (articulating a viewpoint that is contrary and much
less paranoid than Janice Raymond’s); Rose, supra note 4, at 50-52.
79. See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087.
80. See Reginald E. Jones, Address to the Sixth International Conference on Transgender Law and
Employment Policy, available at http://www.abmall.com/ictlep/jonesspeech.html (last visited July
11, 2001) (commenting on the late transsexual attorney JoAnna McNamera’s hypothetical and
the dichotomy that Title VII’s current form presents). Although Jones, then an EEOC
Commissioner, saw the validity of the analogy, its logic has yet to be adopted by courts.
81. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1205.
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against transsexuals who seek protection from employment
discrimination under Title VII. “According to Mitchell,” Judge
Reinhardt stated, “Schwenk has alleged only that the attack occurred
because of Schwenk’s transsexuality, which, Mitchell contends, is not
an element of gender, but rather constitutes gender dysphoria, a
82
psychiatric illness.” Much of Title VII case law specifically dealing
with transsexuals, including the Ninth Circuit’s Holloway,83 would have
backed this defense. As Judge Reinhardt accurately summarized
these cases:
Male-to-female transsexuals, as anatomical males whose outward
behavior and inward identity did not meet social definitions of
masculinity, were denied the protection of Title VII by these courts
because they were the victims of gender, rather than sex,
84
discrimination.

However, he then made a bold statement that immediately brought
the opinion to the attention of all supporters of transgender rights:
The initial judicial approach taken in cases such as Holloway has
been overruled by the logic and language of Price Waterhouse [v.
85
Hopkins]. In Price Waterhouse, which was decided after Holloway and
Ulane, the Supreme Court held that Title VII barred not just
discrimination based on the fact that Hopkins was a woman, but
also discrimination based on the fact that she failed “to act like a
woman” — that is, to conform to socially-constructed gender
86
expectations.

In short, in Judge Reinhardt’s view, Price Waterhouse had overruled
87
the long string of anti-transsexual Title VII decisions.

82. Id. at 1200.
83. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661 n.3 (articulating the viewpoint that many “judgments about
male to female transsexuals have varied from the opinion that a request for a sex change is a
sign of severe psychopathology to the opinions that these persons are psychologically normal”).
84. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1201.
85. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
86. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1201-02 (citations in original omitted) (focusing on the flawed
analysis of cases such as Holloway).
87. Somewhat oddly, the criticism of Judge Reinhardt’s Schwenk opinion by the right-wing
Family Research Council was not directed at the Title VII dicta, which will likely be transsexuals’
biggest gain from Schwenk on the anti-discrimination front, but rather at the holding that
transsexuals are covered under the GMVA — which had already been overturned by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Morrison. See FRC Announces Winners of 2000 Court Jester Awards; Judges
‘Roasted’ For ‘Ridiculous Rulings,’ PR NEWSWIRE, June 30, 2000. The FRC declared Schwenk to be
one of four Ninth Circuit decisions that “appear to have been made in the dark.” Id.
Moreover, considering that, as Reinhardt pointed out, the GMVA applied “without qualification
to ‘all persons within the United States. . . ,’” rather than the Ninth Circuit it seems that the
FRC is in dire need of a light bulb. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1200 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b)
(1999)).
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C. Stepping Back
Judge Reinhardt’s dicta is extremely significant for transgendered
people due to the fact that current language of the proposed federal
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (“ENDA”),88 a bill intended to
prohibit employment discrimination based on sexual orientation, is
purposely written so as not to include transgendered people among
those specifically mentioned as included classes. Unlike the enacted
version of the ADA,89 ENDA does not currently contain language
which specifically excludes transgendered people. In the bill,
“‘sexual orientation’ means homosexuality, bisexuality, or
heterosexuality, whether the orientation is real or perceived.”90 Of
course, the words “real or perceived” should be an umbrella that
91
covers transgendered people. Yet, Title VII’s umbrella capability has
rarely been used to the benefit of non-heterosexuals.92 As British law
professor, and female-to-male transsexual, Stephen Whittle has
noted, federal courts have “gone out of their way to find that existing
federal non-discrimination laws do not apply to transgendered
93
individuals.”
Likewise, many gay proponents of ENDA sadly have also gone out
of their way to ensure that ENDA will not benefit transgendered
94
people. ENDA’s chief sponsor, Rep. Barney Frank, as well as the
most visible gay and lesbian lobbying group, the Human Rights
88. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1999, H.R. 2355, 106th Cong. (1999)
(providing remedies for employment discrimination based on sex).
89. American With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990).
90. H.R. 2355, 106th Cong. (1999).
91. Id.
92. See Stephen Whittle, Gemeinschaftsfremden — or How to Be Shafted by Your Friends:
Sterilization Requirements and Legal Status Recognition for the Transsexual, in LEGAL QUERIES 42, 47
(Leslie Moran et al. eds. 1998) (finding that transgendered people have not been included in
Title VII’s sexual orientation penumbra).
93. Id. (quoting from PROCEEDINGS FROM THE SECOND CONFERENCE ON TRANSGENDER LAW
(1993)).

AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY

94. The openly gay Massachusetts Representative, in his backing of this non-inclusivity, has
exhibited a staggering degree of disingenuousness, justifying his non-inclusion of
transgendered people with his vote for the ADA. At the 1999 reintroduction of ENDA
Frank forthrightly raised the fact that ‘this bill does not protect everybody,’ specifically
transgender people. He explained that no bill has ever done that, yet he eagerly voted
for legislation ending gender discrimination, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and
others that did not include protection for him. ‘There is no magic button we can push
that will protect everybody all at once.’
Bob Roehr, Enda Back, OUTLINES (June 30, 1999), available at http://www.outlineschicago.com.
This assumes that homosexuals truly would be willing to accept a federal government
declaration that homosexuality is an “impairment” if it meant employment anti-discrimination
protection - which is doubtful. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211(a) (2000) (“For purposes of the definition
of “disability” in [42 USC] § 12102(2), homosexuality and bisexuality are not impairments and
as such are not disabilities under this [Act].”).
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95
are adamantly opposed to including
Campaign (“HRC”),
transgendered people in ENDA. Though transgendered people are
lobbying to change the current non-inclusive wording, many believe
that “HRC has been undermining [such] efforts.”96 Frank justifies
excluding all transgendered people from the bill because of nebulous
97
However, the
“political and substantive complications.”
“complications” are situations in which pre-operative transsexuals
might be in employment settings that require use of “communal
showers.”98
The exclusion fails to protect all post-operative
transsexuals as well as those pre-operative ones whose work
environments do not involve communal showers (law firms
immediately come to mind as one example — the Ally McBeal-style
unisex bathroom notwithstanding).99
Schwenk could alleviate the need for the aforementioned discussion
100
to continue. However, this will only be so if Judge Reinhardt’s take
101
102
Although an
on Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins carries the day.
argument can be made that five Justices in Price Waterhouse did
approve of gender stereotyping being impermissible under Title VII,
the oft-quoted portion of the Court’s decision was a plurality opinion,

95. HRC was formerly the Human Rights Campaign Fund (HRCF).
96. Kirk D. Richards, Power Tour Urges Gays to Vote, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 10, 1999, at
3D (quoting Cathryn Platine, President of the Midwest Transsexual Alliance); see also Symposium:
Queer Law 1999: Current Issues in Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered Law, 27 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 279, 366-67 (1999).
The report of a lesbian being responsible for scuttling an effort to add transgendered people to
California’s anti-discrimination law has, of course, done nothing to ease tensions between
transgendered people and those homosexuals — HRC members or otherwise — who are
perceived as being anti-transgender. See Szymanski, supra note 6, at 6.
97. Barney Frank, Letter to the Editor: Special Protection, S.F. CHRON., July 11, 2000, at A26.
98. What Rep. Barney Frank Thinks About TG Inclusion in ENDA, The Subversion of the
American Transgender Movement: A Report From HRC Watch, available at www.gendernet.org/
hrcwatch/subvert.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2001).
99. In fact, at least within the confines of the Ally McBeal universe, the transphobia of
several of the firms partners, insofar as a pre-operative male-to-female transsexual having a
penis, recently was shown to transcend the bathroom issue and go directly to the person’s very
existence. See Ally McBeal: Without a Net (FOX television broadcast, Nov. 13, 2000) (on file with
author).
100. Professor Chai Feldblum has described the animosity between the transgender
community and HRC (then HRCF) at the time of the initial trans-exclusionary ENDA in 1994 as
a “mini-war.” Chai R. Feldblum, The Federal Gay Rights Bill: From Bella to ENDA, in CREATING
CHANGE - SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 182-83 (John D’Emilio et al. eds., 2000).
101. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
102. It was persuasive in the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities’
recent interpretation of ‘sex’ to include ‘gender’ in the state’s employment anti-discrimination
statute. See Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, Declaratory Ruling on
Behalf of John/Jane Doe, available at http://www.state.ct.us/chro/metapages/HearingOffice/
HODecisions/declaratoryrulings/DRDoe.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2001) [hereinafter Declaratory
Ruling].
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to which only one signatory, Justice Stevens, is still on the Court.
The possibility that ‘sex = gender’ may be repudiated when next the
Supreme Court looks at the issue, together with the conflation of
sexual orientation and gender identity in Ulane poses the very real
possibility that ENDA, enacted with no explicit transgender inclusion
in the definition of sexual orientation, would be viewed as intent by
Congress not to protect transgendered people in any form.104
Currently, however, ENDA is still only a proposal and it is still far
too soon to tell whether Schwenk will have the effect on employment
105
law for which transsexuals are hoping. Judge Reinhardt’s opinion
does not appear to have any transgender-related Title VII progeny
yet,106 although a Second Circuit decision involving a homosexual
male, even while finding against the plaintiff, did favorably cite Price
Waterhouse’s and Schwenk’s take on “sexual stereotypes” as being
“cognizable as discrimination based on sex.”107 However, Judge
Walker cautioned, “This theory would not bootstrap protection for
sexual orientation into Title VII because not all homosexual men are
103. Justice White’s concurrence addressed only the burden-shifting issue. See Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258. Justice O’Connor, however, not only addressed burden-shifting but
also seemingly approved of the concept of gender stereotyping being violative of Title VII. See
id. at 278 (O’Connor, J., concurring). More significantly, though, she used both ‘sex’ and
‘gender’ interchangeably. See id. at 272-74. Even taking this into account, an assertion that ‘sex
= gender’ was the majority holding of the Court in Price Waterhouse is one which, though
possibly correct, rests on a foundation shaky enough that homosexuals cannot legitimately
expect transgendered people to rely upon it alone to alleviate anti-transgender employment
discrimination on a national level.
104. See Feldblum, supra note 100, at 183 (defending HRC’s mid-1990s stance with the selfcongratulatory, “[a]lthough HRCF refused to agree that ENDA would include protection based
on gender identity when it was reintroduced, HRCF did agree not to oppose any amendment
that added such protection were such an amendment to be offered.”). What this does not
address is whether the current HRC (or even the then HRCF) would, in any meaningful way,
oppose introduction of an explicit exclusion of gender identity similar to that which was attached
to the Americans With Disabilities Act. See Rose, Littleton v. Prange, supra note 19, at 8.
Essentially, this type of exclusion, albeit far less than that in the ADA, is what occurred in the
hate crime bill enacted by the State of Texas in 2001. 2001 Tex. Sess. Laws Serv. 85, § 1.02
(West 2001) (amending Article 42.014 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure). Though
originally containing “perceived as” language, the final so-called compromise bill contained the
following, “In this article, ‘sexual preference’ has the following meaning only: a preference for
heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality.” Id. (emphasis added).
105. See Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 441 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (referring to
Schwenk case as support for finding constitutional violation when prison guards forced a
female prisoner to perform a striptease).
106. See Declaratory Ruling, supra note 102 (limiting the declaratory ruling to determine
whether “discrimination against transsexual persons” is a form of sexual discrimination rather
than a “physical and/or mental disability”). Schwenk was also cited favorably in a nonemployment case involving a transgendered student in Massachusetts; see also Doe ex rel. Doe v.
Yunits, No. 00-1060A, 2001 WL 664947, at *6 (Mass. Super. Feb. 26, 2001) (granting plaintiff’s
motion to return to junior high school wearing clothes consistent with her gender identity).
107. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting as a substantial argument
that the abuse suffered was discrimination based on sexual stereotypes may be cognizable as
discrimination based on sex).
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stereotypically feminine, and not all heterosexual men are
stereotypically masculine. But, under this theory, relief would be
108
available for discrimination based upon sexual stereotypes.”
IV. NO DEFENSE FOR THE STATE’S DEFENSE
A. First Glance
In this section, I focus on what appears to be the most serious of
the incidents alleged by Ms. Schwenk to have occurred — the claim
that Mitchell unzipped his pants, pulled out his penis, demanded oral
sex, grabbed her, turned her around forcibly, pushing her against the
109
bars and grinding his exposed penis into her buttocks. The defense
asserted that “Schwenk’s allegations constitute at worst ‘same-sex
110
sexual harassment’ and not sexual assault.”
Upon first reading it, I thought that I might have misread that
sentence — at least insofar as the ultimate intent of the assertion. I
could easily accept as being conceivably legitimate any number of
defenses to Ms. Schwenk’s claims. The most obvious, of course,
would be innocence. No one, transgender rights advocate or
otherwise, could have a legitimate complaint over the state defending
Mitchell if he put forth a legitimate defense to the effect that he did
not commit the acts in question.111 Nor could there be a serious
complaint even if there were another non-substantive defense such as
the running of the statute of limitations. 112 It just did not seem
108. Id. at 38. Additionally, in an Equal Credit Opportunity Act case that did not cite
Schwenk, the First Circuit recently used the reasoning of Price Waterhouse to rule in favor of a
crossdresser who had been denied credit based on gender norms. See Rosa v. Park West Bank &
Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 216 (1st Cir. 2000).
109. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1194.
110. Id. at 1198 (finding the defense’s argument unsupported by case law because of the
physical sexual conduct). Washington criminal law utilizes the word “rape” rather than the
phrase “sexual assault.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.040 (West 2000).
111. “An interlocutory appeal . . . does not lie from a denial of qualified immunity when the
claim is one of factual insufficiency.” Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 197 (3d
Cir. 2000) (quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996)). “Stated another way — an
‘I didn’t do it’ argument is not recognizable in this context.” Id. (quoting Reyes v. Sazan, 168
F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1999)). Nevertheless, the claim itself would be one on which the state
should be obligated to support him. See also Doe v. Bowles, 254 F.3d 617, 622 (6th Cir. 2001)
(stating that material questions of fact can preclude determination of whether prison employee
sued by transsexual inmate is entitled to qualified immunity).
112. In fact, much to the consternation of some transsexual legal advocates, I feel that a
time-line issue may have been legitimately fatal to Christie Lee Littleton’s wrongful death claim
which was disallowed in Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999), even if she had
prevailed, either at the Texas Court of Appeals or at the U.S. Supreme Court, on the question
of her current gender status. Ms. Littleton did not amend her birth certificate to reflect her
gender transition prior to her marriage. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231. Consequently, it would
be conceivable that a court could have ruled her to be legally female currently but to have been
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possible, though, that attorneys for the state, even in the context of
defending a prison guard, would argue that the acts described by Ms.
Schwenk, if true, would not constitute sexual assault. However, an email correspondence with Ms. Schwenk’s attorney, Jeffry Finer of
Finer & Pugsley, P.S., indicated that I was not in any way imagining
the ludicrous posture of the defense. At the appellate level, “the
State tried very hard to argue that the alleged conduct did not
113
He added, “Some of the trial level briefs
amount to an assault.”
were even funnier, if that’s the right word.”114
B. Not So Funny
In the state’s attempt to argue that the allegations would not
115
constitute a “crime of violence,” as that term is used in the GMVA,
the argument was made that Mitchell’s alleged “actions, even if true,
have not been determined to be actions which would constitute a
crime of violence, or actions which presented a serious risk of
physical injury.”116 According to Judge Reinhardt, “The district court
performed the correct analysis and properly concluded that
Schwenk’s allegations, if proved, would fall within the definition of
attempted rape, which is a felony in the state of Washington.”117
1.

Was Judge Reinhardt Correct?

The Washington rape statutes define more than one level of rape.
First degree rape involves “sexual intercourse with another person by
forcible compulsion where the perpetrator or an accessory” to the
offense “uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon or what appears to
118
Second degree rape is engaging in “sexual
be a deadly weapon.”
intercourse with another person: (a) by forcible compulsion; (b)
when the victim is incapable of consent by reason of being physically
helpless or mentally incapacitated;”119 and under circumstances which

legally male at the time of her marriage. See Rose, Transsexual and the Damage Done, supra note 4,
at 8.
113. E-mail from Jeffry Finer, attorney of Finer & Pugsley, P.S. to Katrina C. Rose (Mar. 20,
2000, 20:44:25 CST) (on file with author).
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2) (1999).
Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1199.
Id.

118. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.040(1)(a) (West Supp. 2000). The words “including
but not limited to physical injury which renders the victim unconscious” were added to
subsection (c) subsequent to the time of the facts in Ms. Schwenk’s allegations. 1998 Wash.
Laws ch. 242 § 1.
119. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.050(1) (West Supp. 2000).
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do not constitute first degree rape. Third degree rape is engaging in
sexual intercourse with a person “not married to the perpetrator (a)
where the victim did not consent to sexual intercourse with the
perpetrator and such lack of consent was clearly expressed by the
120
victim’s words or conduct,” or “(b) where there is threat of
substantial unlawful harm to property rights of the victim . . .”121 and
under circumstances that constitute neither first nor second degree
rape.
122
The phrase “sexual intercourse,” in addition to having its
ordinarily understood meaning, also “means any act of sexual contact
between persons involving the sex organs of one person and the
mouth or anus of another whether such persons are of the same or
opposite sex.”123 “Sexual contact” is defined as “any touching of the
sexual or other intimate parts of a person done for the purpose of
gratifying sexual desire of either party or a third party.”124 The
Washington Supreme Court recently noted that “although the word
‘any’ is not defined by the statute, ‘Washington courts have
repeatedly construed the word ‘any’ to mean ‘every’ and ‘all.’”125
“‘Forcible compulsion’ means physical force which overcomes
resistance, or a threat, express or implied, that places a person in fear
of death or physical injury to herself or himself or another person, or
in fear that she or he or another person will be kidnapped.”126
Moreover, “[a] person is guilty of an attempt to commit crime if, with
120. “‘Consent’ means that at the time of the act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact
there are actual words or conduct indicating freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse
or sexual contact.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010 (7) (West Supp. 2000).
121.
122.
123.
124.

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.060 (West 2000).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(1)(a) (West 2000).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(1)(c) (West 2000) (emphasis added).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(2) (West 2000) (emphasis added).

125. State v. Tili, 985 P.2d 365, 370 (Wash. 1999) (quoting State v. Smith, 814 P.2d 652, 656
(Wash. 1991) (quoting State v. Harris, 693 P.2d 750, 751 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985)) (finding the
defendant guilty of first degree rape).
In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals discussed in State v. Waddle, though
in the context of a child rape case, the issue of “sexual contact” if the alleged act takes place
through clothing. 1998 WL 306591, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). “Proof of contact with a
child’s intimate parts by an unrelated adult with no caretaking function supports an inference
the contact was for the purpose of sexual gratification. Additional proof of sexual gratification
may be required if the touching is on top of the child’s clothing.” Id. at 3 (citing State v. Powell,
816 P.2d 86, 88 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, 824 P.2d 491 (1992)). That distinction
could be significant to a differentiation between attempted rape and rape as Judge Reinhardt’s
opinion, while noting that Mitchell’s penis was exposed when he “began grinding [it] into her
buttocks,” did not specify whether Ms. Schwenk’s buttocks were covered or were exposed
resulting in skin-to-skin contact of even a slight duration. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1194. However,
because the determination at issue before the Ninth Circuit involved “attempted rape,” I will
not address that distinction.
126. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010 (6) (West 2000).
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intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which is a
127
substantial step toward the commission of that crime,” and “a
‘substantial step’ is conduct strongly corroborative of the actor’s
criminal purpose.”128
In State v. Aumick, the Washington Supreme Court noted that
neither force nor actual physical contact is necessary to find that the
129
“substantial step” threshold of first degree rape has been crossed.
That decision upheld a decision of the Court of Appeals which
included the following passage: “The unlawful touching or the placing
of the victim in apprehension of harm is a necessary element of attempted
first degree rape by forcible compulsion.”130
2.

Statutory Correctness — From Washington to Florida

Given the above statutory framework and judicial interpretations, I
see no rational conclusion other than that the actions alleged by Ms.
Schwenk to have been committed by Robert Mitchell, if true, would
indeed constitute some level of attempted rape under Washington
131
law. In fact, in all likelihood, the actions alleged by Ms. Schwenk to
have occurred in her cell constitute a substantial step toward first
degree rape, with there seeming to be little, if any, possibility of a
spin being put on the facts as alleged by her which would show her
not to have been “in apprehension of harm.” Mitchell may or may
not have had some implement on his person which would generally
be thought of as a deadly weapon, but Gianna Israel, a gender
specialist who has consulted in litigation involving transgendered
inmates, notes that
a guard with or without a weapon is a deadly weapon. At any time
he has the power to impose infractions, get the individual
transferred to more dangerous housing, set the inmate up in a bad
situation, or work in tandem with other guards to have someone
132
injured or killed.

As the facts of Schwenk, at least as accepted by Judge Reinhardt,
show, some of those scenarios were in play in the events that
127. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.28.020(1) (West 2000).
128. See State v. Aumick, 894 P.2d 1325, 1329 (Wash. 1995).
129. See id. (determining that a “substantial step” meets the threshold to find a perpetrator
guilty of criminal intent).
130. State v. Aumick, 869 P.2d 421, 424 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis added).
131. “A person is guilty of an attempt to commit crime if, with intent to commit a specific
crime, he does any act which is a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.” WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.28.020(1) (West 2000).
132. E-mail from Gianna Israel, Community Counselor and Author, Counselsuite (July 30,
2001, 02:47:14 CDT) (on file with author).
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133

transpired between Crystal Schwenk and Robert Mitchell.
Crystal Schwenk, of course, is not the only pre-operative
transsexual to have been sexually assaulted by a prison guard while in
confinement. As a corollary, it must be noted that not all inmates
who are sexually assaulted by prison guards are pre-operative
transsexuals. Recently, an editorial in the Fort Lauderdale SunSentinel concluded with the following thought: “Whatever their legal
status, immigrant detainees have certain rights as human beings. At
the very least, they have the right not to be raped or physically abused
134
by their jailers.” While I certainly agree with that sentiment, it is a
bit unsettling that its author did not say the same for transsexuals
because, despite allegations of numerous sexual assaults at the Krome
INS detention center, the primary incident which spurred the
editorial was the charging of Krome guard Lemar Andre Smith with
the rape of an immigrant detainee who happened to be transsexual,
Christina Madrazo.135
Madrazo had been taken to the center after being apprehended as
136
She asserts that she was raped twice, the
an illegal alien in May.

133. See Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1194 (describing Schwenk’s refusal of a guard’s sexual
advances, objection to assault, threats by the guard to send her to a maximum security unit of
the prison, and a subsequent transfer which caused Schwenk constant fear of rape or other
assault).
134. Detainees Still Have Rights; At Least 10 Guards Under Investigation at Center, FT.
LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 4, 2000, at 18A (emphasis added).
135. See id.
136. See Guard Accused of Raping Inmate, ASSOC. PRESS, Sept. 7, 2000 [hereinafter Guard
Accused] (discussing the alleged repeat rape of Mexican transsexual Christina Madrazo at the
Krome Detention Center).
Madrazo apparently came to the United States to escape the persecution that she was suffering
in Mexico because she is transsexual, and had even sought political asylum. See Jody A.
Benjamin, Grand Jury Indicts Guard on Rape Charges; Allegations Against Others Investigated, FT.
LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 1, 2000, at 1B [hereinafter Grand Jury Indicts]. “A month
before coming to the United States, four men in her home state of Veracruz, Mexico, viciously
beat her up. She spent 20 days in the hospital.” Guard Accused, supra note 136. The Ninth
Circuit recently recognized such persecution as grounds for asylum. See also HernandezMontiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1099 (9th Cir. 2000) (entitling Plaintiff to asylum and
withholding deportation as there was an unrebutted presumption that Plaintiff had a wellfounded fear of persecution if Plaintiff returned to Mexico because of Plaintiff’s sexuality and
gender expression).
Hernandez-Montiel attempted to distinguish between the persecution of men who are
identified as having feminine traits, as it viewed the immigrant in that case, with persecution of
transsexuals by asserting that the Court was not addressing that issue. However, any court
which follows Hernandez-Montiel and finds that persecution of transsexuals does not fall under
the same rubric would be guilty of gross intellectual dishonesty. Whether the issue will arise in
Madrazo’s case is unclear as, according to one report, after the second rape “INS officials gave
her the choice of going to a mental institution or the Dade County Jail, so she signed an order
agreeing to be returned to Mexico.” Guard Accused, supra note 136. However, another report
indicates that she will not be returned, at least not immediately. See Jody A. Benjamin, Detainee
Charges Guard Raped Her; Mexico Native Makes Appeal for Asylum, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL,
Aug. 1, 2000, at 1B [hereinafter Detainee Charges].
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second time coming after having reported the first, though it is
137
unclear whether it was direct retaliation. According to Madrazo, “I
tried to defend myself, but he’s a big man and I’m a small woman.”138
The Krome Center had apparently been the subject of allegations
throughout its twenty-year history but, according to Cheryl Little,
Executive Director of the Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center, “This
is the first time I know about where an officer has actually been
139
indicted.”
“She is just really happy that the government is taking the situation
at Krome seriously,” said Madrazo’s attorney, Robert Sheldon.140 “She
had almost given up.”141 Federal officials have taken Madrazo’s
allegations seriously enough to undertake an investigation which has
yielded criminal sexual assault and sexual abuse indictments against
the guard. Regarding the previous lack of investigation into the
activities at Krome, Little has also stated, “[b]ecause guards have
been doing this for years and have gotten away with it, they have no
reason to believe anything will ever happen to them.”142
Those who defended Mitchell in Washington against civil claims
tried to characterize his actions against Crystal Schwenk — even
under the assumption that they are true — only as sexual harassment.
How can that not be construed as a message that such activity is not
worthy of punishment under criminal law?
V. THE ROBERT MITCHELL DEFENSE: WHY IT SHOULD
MATTER TO EVERYONE?
A. A Conflict of . . . Convenience?
I am He
As You are He
As You are Me
And we are all together.143
Even those in agreement with the Ninth Circuit, as well as my
137. Guard Accused, supra note 136.
138. Id.
139. Grand Jury Indicts, supra note 136, at 1B. A cynical view might be that a rape of a
transsexual is what it took to spur investigative action. I do not believe that such a view would
be proper, particularly in light of how transsexuals are generally treated by the system when
they are victims of crime.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Detainee Charges, supra note 135.
The Beatles, I am the Walrus, on MAGICAL MYSTERY TOUR (Capitol 1967).
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critique, might still have a question. Namely, why should this issue be
of any concern to anyone other than transsexual prisoners and those
who advocate for them?
Simply put — the obvious: The defender is also often a prosecutor.
States vary as to the role which the Office of the State Attorney
144
General does, or even can, play in criminal prosecutions.
Irrespective of the organ of government which actually does the work
attendant to them, criminal prosecutions are brought in the name of
the state. The state is also responsible for bringing, as well as
defending against, numerous types of civil actions. The advent of the
administrative state has resulted in situations where a state attorney
general’s office has represented both sides in conflicts between
dueling agencies.145
It should not, therefore, be terribly surprising that intra-state
conflicts between criminal law enforcement and civil legal logistics
can arise. As a preface to examination of the particular problem
which could have manifested itself as a result of Washington’s
defense of Robert Mitchell, I feel it instructive to look at an intra-state
conflict which has arisen in Texas.
Refer back to the 1999 Texas Court of Appeals’ decision in Littleton
146
v. Prange. The 2-1 majority invalidated the marriage of Christie Lee
Littleton and Jonathan Littleton because Christie Lee is a male-to147
148
female transsexual. As I detailed in my article about the decision,
149
Ms. Littleton’s counsel handled her case abominably,
and
numerous theories which might have caused the outcome to be more
144. Although typically thought of as being involved in criminal prosecutions at the appeal
stage, states run the gamut in terms of the power of attorney generals to participate in criminal
prosecutions: from exclusive prosecutorial authority to none. See Committee on the Office of
the Attorney General, National Association of Attorneys General, The Attorney General’s Role
in Prosecution, Table 2, at 6-10 (1977); see also NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., STATE
ATTORNEYS GENERAL, POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 281-83 (Lynne M. Ross, ed., BNA Books
1990).
145. See Robert M. McGreevey, The Illinois Attorney General’s Representation of Opposing State
Agencies - Conflicts of Interest, Policy and Practice, ILL. B.J., Feb. 1978, at 308 (discussing the role of
Illinois Attorney General in representing opposing agencies in a dispute, which would create a
conflict of interest in private practice).
146. 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999) (holding that Christie Littleton is a male, and
could not be married to another male and therefore, could not bring a cause of action as a
surviving spouse).
147. See generally id.
148. See Rose, Transsexual and the Damage Done, supra note 4, at 8. I became privy to
additional information on this issue after the article went to press. See generally Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, Littleton v. Prange, 531 U.S. 872 (2000).
149. This reference is to her counsel of record at Texas’ Fourth Court of Appeals rather
than to Phyllis Frye and Alyson Meiselman, who resurrected the case after Littleton’s original
counsel failed to timely petition for a rehearing following the Texas Supreme Court’s denial of
review of the Court of Appeals decision.
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150
151
One of these
favorable to her were not set forth on her behalf.
was the fact that the Texas Attorney General’s Office did regard her
as female and did recognize her marriage when it came to the issue
of collection of her husband’s child support obligation to his
152
Texas, of course, is a
children from a previous marriage.
153
community property state.
Now, arguably, the Texas Attorney General’s garnishment of Ms.
Littleton’s wages was a ministerial act and in no way on par with a
formal or informal attorney general opinion. Nevertheless, it did
154
occur throughout the early to mid 1990s. Almost twenty years prior
to Littleton v. Prange, in an entirely different type of court case, the
State of Texas all but declared that gender transition was recognized
under Texas law. The reason for doing so was somewhat nefarious,
but it did occur — and it is a footnote (literally) to a controversy that,
as of this writing, is still alive and kicking in a Texas appellate court,
albeit not as part of the same case.155
The earlier of the cases was Baker v. Wade,156 one of numerous
challenges to the constitutionality of Section 21.06 of the Texas Penal
Code, popularly known as Texas’ sodomy law even though, in
actuality, it only criminalizes conduct between members of the same
157
In Baker, the mere possibility of undergoing a “surgical sex
sex.
change” was proffered by the state as a reason to deny standing to the
homosexual male who was challenging Section 21.06.158 Citing Babbit

150. See Rose, Transsexual and the Damage Done, supra note 4, at 120 (noting that Littleton’s
counsel could have presented various theories that may have changed the outcome of her case,
at least with respect to her current gender.
151. Id.
152. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Littleton v. Prange, 531 U.S. 872 (2000) (No. 0025).
153. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.001-3.003 (Vernon 1998).
154. A different issue entirely could arise now that the U.S. Supreme Court has denied
review to Ms. Littleton’s petition for writ of certiorari: Will the Texas Attorney General’s Office
return the money that was garnished from her? It seems as though Ms. Littleton will have an
opportunity to collaterally challenge the Texas Appeals Court declaration that she is male in an
action to seek the refund of that money that was garnished. However, insofar as her gender is
concerned, it actually would be to her advantage to lose on the issue of seeking the return of
the money.
155. See Lawrence v. State, Nos. 14-99-00109-CR and 14-99-00111-CR, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS
3760 (Tex. Ct. App. June 8, 2000), rev’d on reh’g, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001).
156. 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1124 (N.D. Tex. 1982), appeal dismissed, 743 F.2d 236 (5th Cir.
1984), rev’d on reh’g, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
157. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 1999) (“A person commits an offense if
he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.”); see also TEX.
PEN. CODE ANN. § 21.01(b) (Vernon 1999) (“[D]eviate sexual intercourse” includes “the
penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object.”).
158. See Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1147 n.62. This, of course, illuminates the inaccuracy of
statements such as “[d]espite recent efforts to link them, the gay and transgender movements
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159
160
v. United Farm Workers and Steffel v. Thompson, District Judge
Buchmeyer held that it was “not necessary for the plaintiff to expose
himself to actual arrest and prosecution in order to challenge §
21.06.”161 He went on to note:

Although there may be practical problems in obtaining convictions
under § 21.06, the threat of prosecution is “credible” and “real.”
For example, participants can be prosecuted if a third person
observes their acts of homosexual sodomy. Moreover, § 21.06 can
be—and has been—used by the state if there is some doubt as to
whether the conduct occurred in a public place. The state has
certainly not “disavowed any intention” of invoking the statute in
162
either of these instances.

However, it was in a footnote that Buchmeyer referred to the
State’s “baseless, but imaginative” argument to deny standing that
163
included the existence of transsexualism as one prong. The State
claimed that Section 21.06, “may not ever be enforced against the
plaintiff because of a myriad of circumstances under his control, e.g.,
a change in preference for sexual partners, a surgical sex change, or a
physical inability to locate a suitable male sexual partner.”164
The Baker suit was ultimately unsuccessful, as was another challenge
165
to the statute. Although, a Houston appeals court, in June of 2000,
ruled in Lawrence v. State that Section 21.06 was violative of the Equal
Rights Amendment to the Texas Constitution, a full court, on
rehearing overruled the June decision and found the statute did not
violate federal or state equal protection guarantees.166
have little in common,” made by those homosexuals who oppose transgender inclusivity. Paul
Varnell, Same Sex Marriage, Sort of, CHI. FREE PRESS, Sept. 6, 2000.
159. 442 U.S. 289, 299 (1979) (holding that challenges to provisions regulating election
procedures, consumer publicity, and criminal sanctions presented “case or controversy”).
160. 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974) (holding that petitioner who had been threatened by police
with arrest for violating Georgia criminal trespass law if he did not stop handing out antiVietnam handbills on the sidewalk presented an actual controversy and did not preclude
federal declaratory relief).
161. Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1146.
162. Id. at 1146-47 (parentheticals omitted).
163. Id. at 1147 n.62.
164. Id. (emphasis in original).
165. See generally State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (finding the
statute unconstitutional), rev’d on other grounds, 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994).
166. See Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 357; see also Tim Fleck, HOUS. PRESS, Court on a Hot Tin Roof,
(July 20, 2000), available at http://www.houstonpress.com/issues/2000-07-20/insider.html
(reporting that prior to the scheduling of the re-rehearing, the two Justices who ruled that the
statute was unconstitutional were pressured by the Harris County Republican Party to change
their decision); Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Criminal Investigation Sought Because of Alleged Pressure
Tactics: Sodomy Ruling Sparks Outcry From Republican Party, TEX. LAW., July 17, 2000, at 6 (noting
that a district judge requested the Attorney General to investigate allegations of political
pressure for an en banc hearing on the two appellate justices who declared § 21.06
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This decision, handed down several months after Littleton v. Prange,
gave no indication that the state was desirous of making the same
“surgical sex change” argument in Lawrence that it had made in
Baker.167 Arguably, Littleton would not have foreclosed such an
argument because it and Lawrence occurred in different Texas
appellate districts and, similar to the operation of authoritativeness of
federal circuit decisions, a decision from one Texas appellate district
is not binding authority in the others.
B. Not Slippery, But a Slope Nevertheless
Schwenk v. Hartford involved a suit by a state prison inmate against
state prison guards — state employees acting in their official
168
capacities — arising from allegations of rape, one of the most
egregious physical violations of a person’s body imaginable. The
Texas cases cited above touch on one of the most important aspects
of a transsexual’s life: the person’s very identity. This, of course, is a
question of legal status. Physical safety is of concern to transsexuals
as well — as it is to all people.
The state employees in Schwenk were defended by a Washington
169
State Assistant Attorney General. The position of that defense was
that the actions alleged do not constitute attempted rape.170 If that
position of the State of Washington regarding what is and is not
“sexual assault” is good enough for a state prison guard “goose” in a
civil rights action, then why should it not be good enough for an
average, civilian “gander” in a criminal prosecution for rape or
attempted rape?
Merely taking a position repugnant to a certain segment of the

unconstitutional in the June, 2000 panel).
167. See Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 357-58.
168. See Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1205 (finding state prison guard accused of raping a
transsexual prisoner not entitled to qualified immunity under prisoner’s § 1983 claim but
reversing district court’s denial of immunity under prisoner’s Gender Motivated Violence Act
claim); see also WASH. CONST. art. III, § 21 (stating that “the attorney general shall be the legal
adviser of the state officers”). The attorney general shall:
(3) Defend all actions and proceedings against any state officer or employee acting in
his official capacity, in any of the courts of this state or the United States;
(4) Consult with and advise the several prosecuting attorneys in matters relating to the
duties of their office, and when the interests of the state require, he shall attend the
trial of any person accused of a crime, and assist in the prosecution.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.10.030 (West 1998); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.10.250
(West 1998).
169. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1192.
170. See id. at 1198 (noting that the guard’s position was that prisoner’s allegations were
merely “same-sex sexual harassment” but not sexual assault).
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population does not contravene the Attorney General’s duties.
However, the reality of the State’s position in Schwenk is disturbing.
Much scholarship has been generated over the years as to the
authoritativeness of attorney general opinions as well as to their
proper role in the legal system.172 Though I have been unable to find
any discussion that equates the position taken by an attorney general
in a court filing to a formal (or informal) attorney general opinion, I
see little reason why it should not be viewed in such a light — at least
to some degree.
Speaking specifically of the powers and duties, Wisconsin’s
Attorney General stated, “[b]ecause the Attorney General represents
the state and its agencies in virtually all litigation, he may often have a
decisive voice in establishing state policy simply by declining to
represent the agency or officer asking him to initiate or defend
173
Dee Akers commented, “His opinions being nonlitigation.”
judicial, an attorney general is not as restricted by the implications of
the doctrine of stare decisis as are the courts; nevertheless, the
principles of the doctrine are not to be denied their value in any
174
phase of legal activity.”
Whether regarded as being on par with what is generally thought
of in the legal profession as an attorney general’s opinion or not, the
position taken in Schwenk was certainly an opinion of the Office of the
Attorney General as to what constituted a viable legal theory for
Robert Mitchell’s defense. Judge Reinhardt’s stern rejection of the
State’s argument certainly minimizes the likelihood that use of the
State’s reasoning as a defense for an accused rapist would succeed.
However, that does not negate the fact that the defense was used by
the State in its defense of Mitchell. Consequently, one point bears
repeating: however unlikely that any weight might be given to the
171. See Young Ams. for Freedom v. Gorton, 588 P.2d 195, 196 (Wash. 1978) (upholding a
summary judgment against a group who had challenged the Attorney General’s submission of
an amicus curiae brief in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), because it
disagreed with the Attorney General’s position).
172. See generally Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Constitutional Status and Role of the State Attorney
General, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (1993); Lacy H. Thornburg, Changes in the State’s Law Firm:
The Powers, Duties and Operations of the Office of the Attorney General, 12 CAMPBELL L. REV. 343
(1990); Thomas R. Morris, State Attorneys General as Interpreters of State Constitutions, 17 PUBLIUS
133 (1987); Henry S. Cohn, The Office of the Attorney General of the State of Connecticut and Its
Evolution and Duties, 59 CONN. B.J. 261 (1985); William N. Thompson et al., Conflicts of Interest
and the State Attorneys General, 15 WASHBURN L.J. 15 (1976); Arlen C. Christenson, The State
Attorney General, 1970 WIS. L. REV. 298 (1970); Henry J. Abraham & Robert R. Benedetti, The
State Attorney General: A Friend of the Court?, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 795 (1969); William A. Saxbe,
Functions of the Office of Attorney General of Ohio, 6 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 331 (1957); Dee
Ashley Akers, The Advisory Opinion Function of the Attorney General, 38 KY. L. J. 561 (1950).
173. Christenson, supra note 172, at 312.
174. Akers, supra note 172, at 578-79.
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defense position in Schwenk in any future litigation, the position is
disturbing in its own right.
C. Which People Are Worthy of Being Defended?
While the Attorney General has the duty to defend actions against
175
state officers and employees, the position of the Washington
Supreme Court, and a quite logical one, is that it is the Attorney
General’s “paramount duty to protect the interests of the people of
the state.”176 Even those who are of the opinion that transsexuals are
freaks or merely “aberrant”177 should, in addition to consulting
medical data, which strongly suggests that the idea of an inborn
gender identity that can be at variance with genital appearance is no
myth, but rather, is a medical reality,178 begin to question the lengths
to which governments are willing to go to demonize and to
dehumanize transsexuals, especially those who happen to end up
behind bars.179
The State of California recently agreed to a settlement in litigation

175. And, I again emphasize that this article is not a wholesale criticism of the mere fact that
the State defended Mitchell on some ground, even qualified immunity. My criticism is the
extent to which the State was willing to rationalize away the possible commission of a sexual
assault.
176. Reiter v. Wallgren, 184 P.2d 571, 575 (Wash. 1947); see also State ex rel. Dunbar v. State
Bd., 249 P. 996, 999 (Wash. 1926).
177. Mark’s ultimate opinion of the pre-operative transsexual Cindy. See Ally McBeal, supra
note 99.
178. Irrespective of its ultimate validity, a recent study indicating a biological basis for
transsexualism via a correlation with the incidence of left-handedness among transsexuals
makes for good sound bite fodder. See Nigel Hawkes, Homosexuals More Likely to be Left-Handed,
THE TIMES (LONDON), July 7, 2000, at 10 (noting separate studies coming to the same
conclusion about homosexuals and transsexuals). However, evidence has long suggested that
fetal exposure to hormones plays a strong role. See Rose, Transsexual and the Damage Done, supra
note 4, at 10-12 (citing gender specialists Gianna Israel and Randi Ettner); Julie A. Geeenberg,
Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV.
265, 280 (1999). See generally Milton Diamond, A Critical Evaluation of the Ontogeny of Human
Sexual Behavior, 40 Q. REV. BIOLOGY. 147, 161 (1965); William Reiner, To Be Male or Female —
That is the Question, 151 ARCH. PEDIATRICS ADOLESCENT MED. 224 (1997) (noting, in speaking of
intersexed children, “anatomical (genital) relatedness and appearance may be less dynamic
than the prenatal hormonally differentiated brain”). Not insignificantly, Judge Gernon
concluded his Gardiner opinion with a quote from Reiner’s article. See In re Estate of Gardiner,
22 P.3d 1086, 1110 (Kan. App. 2001) (“In the end it is only the children themselves who can
and must identify who and what they are.”).
179. Because the Ninth Circuit’s opinion addressed allegations as assumed to be true, the
issues I address in this article would not be affected even if Ms. Schewnk ultimately loses or even
is shown to have made up all aspects of her story. Additionally, I have deliberately refrained
from addressing what Ms. Schwenk was incarcerated for and whether there may have been any
anti-transsexual bias involved either in her arrest or her conviction. That is not a part of this
article’s analysis even though there have been instances of those with “alternative lifestyles”
being targeted for elaborately orchestrated police action, and the subject is worthy of
commentary. See United States v. Poehlman, 217 F.3d 692, 697 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a
crossdresser, charged with soliciting sex from a minor had been entrapped into such situation).
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180
brought against it by Torey Tuesday South. Although the ultimate
point on which she prevailed actually was one upon which many
transsexual prisoners are unsuccessful, the seeking of medical
treatment for transsexualism while in prison,181 she also claimed to
have been “brutally raped by a correctional officer” in San Quentin
182
Prison. One can only conjecture as to whether the rape claim may
have played a role in the outcome on the hormone issue. Ultimately
though, in addition to whatever the State’s own costs in defending
the suit may have been, the cost to the State was over $90,000.183
Doubtlessly, the reaction of some to that will be to question the
184
However, the question that should be
sanity of the legal system.

180. See Ex-prisoner Awarded $80,000, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 1, 2000, at A-3. See
generally State Settles Claim by Transsexual, ASSOC. PRESS, Aug. 31, 2000.
181. South v. Gomez, 211 F.3d 1275, No. 99-15976, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3200, at *5 (9th
Cir. Dec. 7, 1999). According to the Ninth Circuit’s memorandum opinion, the issue in South’s
case was “far narrower” than in other cases that had gone against transsexuals seeking hormone
therapy.
The critical element here is that plaintiff was already receiving female hormones when
she was transferred from [one prison to a second prison] . . . . Upon her transfer [to
the second prison], the hormones were abruptly cut off, but not because of any
considered medical judgment.
Thus, the question becomes whether Eighth
Amendment standards [can be] violated when a course of hormone treatment is
abruptly terminated. All of the doctors and experts in this case are of one opinion
that once hormone therapy is begun it should only be terminated by gradually
tapering it, and not by halting it peremptorily.
Id. at *5-6 (quoting the district court’s opinion of the situation in South’s case). The Ninth
Circuit also carefully analyzed another transsexual prisoner’s claim in Allard v. Gomez, No. 0016947, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 13321, at *4 (9th Cir. June 8, 2001) (finding “triable issues as to
whether hormone therapy was denied Allard on the basis of an individualized medical
evaluation or as a result of a blanket rule, the application of which constituted deliberate
indifference to Allard’s medical needs”).
Many, though by no means all, courts have been hostile to prisoners seeking hormone
treatment. See generally Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2000); Claybrooks v.
Tenn. Dep’t of Corrs., No. 98-6271, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 15174, at *3 (6th Cir. July 6, 1999);
Farmer v. Moritsugu, 163 F.3d 610, 612-13 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Murray v. United States Bureau of
Prisons, No. 95-5204, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1716, at *11-12 (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 1997) (per curiam);
Long v. Nix, 86 F.3d 761, 766 (8th Cir. 1996).
The Federal Bureau of Prisons has, at least in the recent past, had a policy favorable to
maintaining transsexual prisoners’ pre-incarceration hormone treatments. Farmer, 163 F.3d at
611-12 (citing FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Pub. L. No. 6000.04, Program
Statement Ch. 1, § 1 (Dec. 15, 1994)).
182. Denny Walsh, State Settles Claim by Transsexual Former Inmate, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 31,
2000, at A5. “I still live with (the rape) every day and night,” South wrote in a 1996 letter to U.S.
Magistrate Judge John F. Moulds. “The nightmares and the memories are aggravated by the
constant abuse, humiliation and sexual harassment that I live with from staff and inmates alike.”
Id.
183. In addition to the $80,000 settlement to South, plus $12,161 in costs related to
defending against the state’s appeal. Id.
184. Refer back to the reaction of the Family Research Council to Judge Reinhardt’s
opinion in Schwenk. See FRC Announces Winners of 2000 Court Jester Awards; Judges ‘Roasted’ For
‘Ridiculous Rulings,’ supra note 87. How can one not interpret FRC’s chiding of Judge Reinhardt
as a de facto defense of a guard’s ‘right’ to sexually assault transsexual inmates?
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asked is whether taxpayers feel that they are getting their money’s
worth with the true cost of prisons hiring sexually predatory prison
185
guards and medical personnel who feel as though they can totally
disregard standard medical practices for inmates, whether those
186
inmates are transsexual or not.
VI. CONCLUSION
A. A Review of the Reality of the Robert Mitchell Defense
The great comedian Richard Pryor once gave thanks to God on
stage for the existence of penitentiaries.187 Though agnostic, I agree
with the gist of his sentiment. Prisons exist for a reason. Likewise,
prisons have guards for a reason. Their existence is a legitimate need
of the state and of the people. Still, how are “the interests of the
people of the state” served by attempting to rationalize away the
sexual assault of any prisoner by any guard?
With that in mind, review the following theories which the State of
Washington argued against Crystal Schwenk:
•

•
•
•

At the time of the alleged incidents, the law was clearly
established that a prison guard may be liable for allowing
someone else to sexually assault an inmate but not for an assault
188
that the guard himself commits;
Ms. Schwenk’s allegations constitute at worst “same-sex sexual
189
harassment;”
190
The acts alleged do not constitute a “crime of violence;”
Despite the GMVA specifically stating it is immaterial “whether
191
or not [the] acts have actually resulted in criminal charges,”
the fact that Ms. Schwenk had not filed criminal charges
192
against Mitchell should act to discredit her claim;

185. In another recent decision, though not one involving a transsexual inmate, it was
noted that one of two guards accused of rape by a female prisoner “pleaded guilty to criminal
charges in connection with the assault.” Stockman v. Lowndes County, No. 1:99CV182-D-D,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16677, at 4 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 21, 2000).
186. Federal prison policy has just recently changed to permit prisoners to receive kidney
transplants, even those who are in end-stage kidney failure. See Susan Okie, Inmates Await
Transplant Reviews; Despite Federal Policy Change, Prisoners Say They’re Ignored, WASH. POST, Nov. 17,
2000, at A3.
187. See LIVE ON THE SUNSET STRIP (Columbia Tri Star 1982).
188. Reinhardt referred to that aspect of the defense as being “both legally and as a matter
of common sense . . . absurd.” Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1198.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id. at 1199.
42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (2000).
Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1199.
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Despite the GMVA’s declaration, “All persons within the United
States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence
193
motivated by gender,” the GMVA covers neither men nor
194
transsexuals; and
An assault that occurs because of a victim’s transsexuality is not
195
an assault because of that victim’s gender.

Those who might disagree with the U.S. Supreme Court’s
admonition that “[b]eing violently assaulted in prison is simply not
part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses
196
against society” should still be left queasy by the cavalier legal
reasoning behind such arguments. Moreover, there should be
universal concern over the potential ramification of the State’s
position as to Mitchell’s specific actions.
The State’s argument constituted a de facto statement that
unzipping one’s pants, pulling out one’s penis, demanding oral sex,
grabbing one’s intended victim, turning that victim around forcibly,
pushing him or her against a wall and grinding one’s exposed penis
into his or her buttocks is only sexual harassment rather than
attempted rape. A successful use of that argument in a criminal trial
by a rightfully accused attempted rapist would allow that sexual
predator to escape justice — and to continue to roam the streets.
How would that possibly serve “the interests of the people of the
State”? The only acceptable answer to that question is that it would
not — and that it cannot. Nevertheless, the argument was put forth.
B. A Review of the Reality of Transsexual Existence
“Arguably, there are few groups in our society today who are as
disadvantaged and disenfranchised as transgenderists and
transsexuals. Fear and hatred of transgenderists and transsexuals
combined with hostility toward their very existence are fundamental
197
human rights issues.”
The above passage appears in one of the more enlightened
statements on the subject of prohibition of anti-transgender
193. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
194. See Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1199-1200 (citing legislative history clearly indicating that the
law was designed to create a federal remedy “by a victim of gender-based violent crime against
his or her attacker”) (emphasis in original).
195. Id. at 1200.
196. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
197. Ontario Human Rights Commission, Policy on Discrimination and Harassment Because of
Gender Identity, available at http://www.ohrc.on.ca (last visited on July 7, 2000) (setting forth
policies to recognize the worth and dignity for all persons, providing equal rights without
discrimination).
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discrimination ever to come from any governmental entity. Sadly, for
transgendered people in the United States, this enlightened
statement was from a Canadian provincial human rights commission.
Employment discrimination due solely to one’s being transsexual
has no definitive recognized remedy under federal law and has
198
199
remedies in only two states’ laws and a few city ordinances.
Transgendered people who find themselves shut out of legitimate
employment possibilities are known to turn to prostitution just to
survive — often with tragic results.200 One study suggests that, after
gender transition, a male-to-female transsexual has a greater chance
201
It is fair to
of being murdered than of ever getting married.
surmise that transsexuals might have a higher likelihood of being

198. See MINN STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01, Subd. 45 & 363.03, Subd. 1(2) (West 2000); see also Doe
ex rel., 2000 WL 33162199, at *7 (Oct. 11, 2000) (stating that Massachusetts maintains a remedy
for transsexual discrimination under its Declaration of Rights laws).
199. See generally CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 2, at 45-50. Madison, Wisconsin recently
added gender identity to its anti-discrimination ordinance. See Council Bans Gender Identity
Discrimination, CAPITOL TIMES (MADISON), Sept. 20, 2000, at 3A. Portland, Oregon is
considering adding similar language to its ordinance. See generally Portland Mayor Wants to Put
Gender Identity in Law, ASSOC. PRESS, Nov. 17, 2000.
200. See Rose, Littleton v. Prange, supra note 19, at 8; see also infra note 208.
201. See generally Nick Napolitano, We Are Considered Disposable People, WASH. BLADE, Dec. 10,
1999. We are also inconvenient people for some in the gay community. See David France, An
Inconvenient Woman, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2000, at 24. France notes that some gays who sought to
make media hay out of the murder of Pfc. Barry Winchell decided to erase from the picture the
fact that his lover, Calpernia Addams, was not a male, but a transsexual female.
[T]he more that Winchell, like Matthew Shepard before him, has been held up as a
martyr for gay equality, the less room there has been for explaining such sloppy
complications. “A lot of people just don’t get that this woman — tall, lovely, beautiful
— has male parts,” explains Kathi Westcott, a staff attorney for Servicemembers’ Legal
Defense Network (S.L.D.N.), the gay soldiers’ group based in Washington. “It was a
difficult connection to make for people, even in the gay community.”
Westcott swept into Tennessee days after the killing determined to investigate
Winchell’s murder and expose the antigay sentiment that persists in the military. She
and Rhonda White, co-director of the Nashville-based Lesbian and Gay Coalition for
Justice, paid Addams a visit and made a proposal. “For the sake of clarity,” White
recalls Westcott saying to Addams, they should tell reporters she is a he. “Barry was
dating an anatomical male,” White says. “How can you say he was gay-bashed if he was
dating a woman, you know?”
Addams, a nightclub performer, agreed — “I was really worried I would lend some sort
of Jerry Springer element to this awful crime,” she says — even though she found it
“devastating” to be called a man, after her long journey away from manhood. In news
accounts, she was Winchell’s “boyfriend” or his “cross-dressing friend,” always he and
him. Each qualification carried the story away from its truth. By superimposing a
rigid grid of sexual identity over the lives of Calpernia Addams and Barry Winchell,
the activists effectively severed the soldier from the love for which he died.
France, at 24. A recent article by Winchell’s parents not only was devoid of any reference to
Addams’ transgender status but seemingly went further in erasing her significance to Winchell,
failing to mention her at all. See Patricia Kutteles & Wally Kutteles, Texas Triangle, Why America
Must Honor ALL Her Veterans (Nov. 17, 2000), available at http://www.txtriangle.com/
archive/906/vp1.html.
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202
In the Ninth Circuit’s
sexually assaulted than non-transsexuals.
Schwenk v. Hartford opinion, transgender employment law and
transgender personal safety issues crossed paths.
The attempt to classify the alleged actions of Robert Mitchell
against Crystal Schwenk as being not a crime of violence and not
gender-motivated is chillingly similar to the District of Columbia’s
assertion that paramedics who stopped treatment on an injured
woman when it was discovered that she was a pre-operative
transsexual had a free speech-based constitutional right to laugh at
203
The transsexual, Tyra Hunter,
her as she lay bleeding to death.
died following a traffic accident.204 However, after the accident but
prior to her death, paramedics who arrived on the scene not only
stopped treatment when they discovered that she had male genitalia
but also began verbally berating her.205 The District of Columbia
initially claimed that that the verbal abuse by the paramedics was
206
The
protected free speech but ultimately dropped the theory.
speech that the District of Columbia attempted to protect included
the paramedics saying, “This bitch ain’t no girl. It’s a nigger, he’s got
a dick,” followed by laughing along with his colleague.207 On a purely
moral level — the attempt to defend such government employee
action is a hate crime in its own right.208

202. As Pat Califia noted in her Advocate advice column, and as should be evident from the
prevalence of the use of transgendered people on television shows such as Jerry Springer’s,
there are people who are turned on by transvestites and transsexuals. PAT CALIFIA, ADVOCATE
ADVISER 151 (1991).
203. See Phyllis Randolph Frye, Facing Discrimination, Organizing for Freedom: The Transgender
Community, in CREATING CHANGE — SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 451, 453
(John D’Emilio et al. eds., 2000).
204. The accident itself was apparently just that — an accident.
atrocity occurred only after treatment of Hunter’s injuries began.

The anti-transgender

205. See Frye, supra note 203, at 453.
206. See Julie Makinen Bowles, D.C. Won’t Seek Exemption From Bias Law in Rescue Case, WASH.
POST, Jan. 29, 1998, at D2.
Although the City had considered challenging a trial court decision favorable to the Hunter
family, a settlement in the case was reached in August 2000 and the matter was closed in
November. While not a pyrhic victory, Rick Rosendall of Gay and Lesbians Activists Alliance
(GLAA) notes, “the emergency room doctor who the jury found to have caused Tyra’s death
still practices medicine at D.C. General, and the firefighter who withdrew medical support from
Tyra at the accident scene was promoted late last year to sergeant.” Rick Rosendall, Tyra Hunter
Settlement Received, Gay and Lesbian Activists Alliance, at http://www.glaa.org/archive/2000/
hunterpayment1117.shtml (Nov. 17, 2000).
207. Desiree Allen Graves, Mom Sues After Son Died Without His Dignity, THE ETHNIC
NEWSWATCH, Feb. 7, 1998, at A1.
208. I have no doubt that this will be viewed by some as hyperbole. However, I stand by the
characterization. Transgendered people who survive barbaric treatment by those who are
supposed to protect and serve them as they would protect and serve non-transgendered people
have been known to commit suicide. See Lynne Smith, Remembering Michelle, on Remembering Our
Dead, available at www.gender.org/remember (last visited Nov. 18, 2000). Smith describes the
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I do not assert that the logical extension of the state’s defense of
Mitchell will ever play out in the courts of Washington or any other
state. I believe that any competent judge would come to the same
conclusion that Judge Stephen Reinhardt did: the actions described
by Crystal Schwenk, if true, constitute attempted rape. However, the
mere possibility that an accused rapist might be able to use the
‘Robert Mitchell Defense’ because of the lengths to which state
attorneys were willing to go to defend the actions of a prison guard
against a transsexual should cause all in the legal profession to
reconsider the inhumane manner in which most areas of the law treat
transsexuals. Might it actually take a successful use of this ‘Robert
Mitchell Defense’ in a criminal trial on attempted rape charges to
open some eyes?
As I stated at the beginning of this article, it was Judge Reinhardt’s
Title VII dicta that first drew my attention to Schwenk v. Hartford.
Irrespective of whether that employment law seed ever bears fruit, the
State of Washington’s defense of Robert Mitchell should stand
forever as the epitome of the willingness of society to deny that
transsexuals are human at all,209 essentially no more than “gender
trash.”210 Whether anybody will pay attention is a different matter
entirely.

suicide of Michelle Lynn O’Hara following an apparently random rape and beating after which
“[s]he was taken to the hospital and was treated with indifference by the hospital staff because
of her transgendered status.” Id. According to Smith, the police were also, at best, indifferent
to O’Hara.
209. Professor Whittle has summarized societal attitude toward transsexuals, “The words
‘man’ and ‘woman’ are used to represent the whole of humanity. And since transgenderists fit
neither keyword, they cannot be part of humanity.” Stephen Whittle, Choice and the Human
Experience, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TRANSGENDER LAW
AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY 23, 25 (1995).
210. The murder of pre-operative transsexual Amanda Milan, a New York sex worker,
exemplified the peripheral circumstances which add to the horror of many transgender
murders. “While a few bystanders tried to help, several of the yellow cab drivers parked along
the street cheered and applauded as Amanda bled to death.” GAIN News, NY Cabbies Applaud
Murder of “Gender Trash,” available at http://gender.org/gain/g00/g062300.html (last visited
July 6, 2000). One witness said that
the detectives and prosecutors have been treating them with relative respect, but that
she gets the impression they are trying to rush this case through and keep it quiet. An
unidentified newspaper reporter was interested in the story of the brutal slaying of a
woman, but not when he learned she was “just a transvestite.”
Id.
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